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Abstract
As health expenditure and need for corresponding funding rises, resorting to topping up insurance
can seem natural. Complementary and supplementary insurances are both topping up contracts
and, as such, are treated as one in the theoretical literature on optimal insurance. We argue that
distinguishing them is crucial, and should be considered carefully when defining policies impacting
the structure of the health insurance system, as these two kinds of insurance can have opposite effects
on social insurance coverage.
In this model, the optimal social insurance rate is defined endogenously and varies according
to redistribution and the ex-post moral hazard characteristics of the insurance. This game has
three stages and is solved through backward induction. The optimal social insurance rate is chosen
first, by maximising social welfare. Second, individuals choose their private complementary and
supplementary contracts. In the third stage they decide on their level of labour and consumption of
health and other goods.
Results indicate that whereas the presence of complementary insurance decreases the optimal
size of social insurance, the offset effects of supplementary insurance can improve welfare.
Keywords. Social insurance; health insurance; ex-post moral hazard; topping up; redistribution.
JEL Classification. D82; I13; I18.
1 Introduction
As health expenditure rises faster than social resources, co-pays can be used to mitigate public
spending in health. When these co-pays become important, allowing private insurance to cover them
can be an appealing way of increasing access to care. This kind of private topping up insurance, known
as complementary insurance, is extensively relied on in France, Belgium and Luxembourg. It is
purchased by segments of the population in other OECD countries, including the United states (cf
Appendix 1 for a classification of mixed systems in the OECD). In the literature, the effects of
complementary insurance are assimilated to the effects of other topping up systems. We argue that
complementary insurance generates specific inefficiencies.
Mixed systems of health insurance have been emerging all around the world in an attempt to combine
the benefits of social and private insurance systems. They are often seen as an opportunity to
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guarantee coverage to all, and avoid increasing public spending. Paradoxically, their efficiency and the
consequences of the interactions between private and social insurance have seldom been studied.
There are two types of topping up contracts. Complementary insurance provides insurance for health
goods that are part of the social bundle and insures the share which is not covered by public insurance.
Supplementary insurance, on the other hand, offers insurance for health goods that are not covered by
social insurance. It is common for countries to have a health system characterised by the presence of
both complementary and supplementary insurances.
To see whether the nature of mixed systems has a systematic effect on health outcomes, cost and
consumption, we turn to the latest OECD analysis of health systems (Paris et al., 2010). Descriptive
statistics on life expectancy, spending, out-of-pocket expenses and consumption were computed by type
of mixed system (see Appendix 1 for the statistics and a more detailed analysis). These descriptive
statistics suggests that complementary insurance may have an ambiguous effect on social welfare -
reducing out-of-pocket expenses but potentially generating moral hazard. In this context, a theoretical
study of health insurance can make sense of these complex phenomena.
This article is related to two well established strands of the literature on exclusive system of insurance.
The first is on the effect of moral hazard on optimal insurance (for seminal papers see the debate
between Arrow (1963, 1968) and Pauly (1968); the results from the RAND experiment (Manning et al,
1987); and the contributions of Nyman (1999)). The second strand is related to the rational for social
insurance, and the role of redistribution in particular (see Cremer and Pestieau, 1996; Henriet and
Rochet, 2006, Pestieau, 2003; Rochet, 1991).
Findings in the literature on optimal coverage show that social insurance is desirable when it generates
redistribution and that moral hazard has a negative effect on coverage. In an exclusive system, the first
best scenario, characterised by no moral hazard, is full insurance. Introducing ex-post moral hazard
acknowledges that insured individuals often disregard the effect their consumption will have on their
premiums and consequently consume more than in the first best situation. It is often considered that in
the presence of moral hazard, full coverage is no longer optimal. However, according to McGuire
(2011), even with some price elasticity, full insurance can be optimal if “the marginal utility when sick
is high enough”.
When private insurance for the same health good (i.e. complementary insurance) is introduced, the
moral hazard effect increases and over-consumption rises. When social insurance plays first and
anticipates private insurance, this leads to a reduction of social coverage; when the insurers play
simultaneously, this leads to over-insurance (Barigozzi, 2006). In these models the only rationale for
social coverage is redistribution. Therefore when individuals are homogeneous in productivity or when
wage rates are heterogeneous and non-correlated to risk, the optimal social coverage is zero (Barigozzi,
2006). Similarly, Boadway et al. (2006) find that when the social planner observes ability and risk, and
can transfer directly through taxation, then, there is no rationale for social insurance coverage.
Consistently, Petretto (1999) finds that the optimal social insurance rate is negatively related to moral
hazard and the correlation between risk and ability.
The study of mixed systems of insurance focuses on the effect of the introduction of social insurance on
the scope of private insurance (designated as the second margin by Barros et al. (2011)) and on the
nature of the interactions between the insurances. These interactions can be inefficient, as in the case
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of increased moral hazard, or efficient as in the case of offset effects. By re-insuring co-payments,
complementary contracts deprive social insurance from a tool to limit ex-post moral hazard. The
simplest form of interaction is the effect insuring a second health good has on an initial insurance
contract. When goods are supplementary (and cross elasticities negative) the insurance of the second
good will provoke a decrease in the consumption of the first good, known as an offset effect, which is
welfare improving. The opposite is true when goods are complementary (and cross elasticities are
positive). As articles on optimal insurance often consider a unique composit health good, the
interactions between different health goods are generally outside their scope. On the other hand,
considerations for interactions between health goods can be found in the literature on the optimal
coverage of drugs and formulary contracts.
Apart for the OECD, the World Health Organization and rare empirical articles that make the
distinction between complementary and supplementary insurances (notable examples are Paris et al,
2010 and 2016; Mossialos and Thomson, 2004; Keane and Stavrunova, 2016), these terms are still
widely used indifferently. In theoretical articles, complementary insurance is systematically designated
under the term ’supplementary insurance’ (Petretto (1999); Barigozzi (2006)) and even in Boone (2015
and 2018) who points out the possible use of the term ”complementary insurance” in this context. In
empirical article, the term ”supplemental” remains widely chosen to characterise complementary
insurance (for example Buchmueller et al., 2004; Jones et al. 2006; Manning and Marquis, 1996;
Marquis and Phelps, 1985 and 1987). This choice of terminology makes distinguishing the two topping
up contracts impossible and is an indication that the distinction between these types of contracts
remains often unclear. By introducing a second health good, this article is able to differentiate these
contracts and illustrates why, and when, making the distinction is necessary.
This paper studies the effect of topping up insurance on the optimal rate of social insurance, in the
presence of ex-post moral hazard. This article is in the line of normative literature that studies the
characteristics of an optimal health insurance system. The aim of this model is to analyse the impact
of supplementary and complementary insurance on the optimal social insurance rate. The study of
supplementary insurance is made possible with the introduction of a second health good. In the
manner of Petretto (1999) we develop a three-stage model of backwards induction. The social planner
moves first by choosing the rate of coverage of the social bundle. Second, individuals choose a private
insurance contract which includes complementary and supplementary components. Third, households
choose their level of labour supply, of expenditure on health and other goods.
Results show that interactions between social and private insurance play a central role in the definition
of optimal insurance rates. We find that the optimal social insurance rate depends on the redistributive
nature of the insured health good and we argue that when studying the interactions between social and
private topping up insurances, complementary and supplementary contracts should be distinguished.
Social and complementary insurance have a crowding out effect on each other and increase inefficiencies
linked to moral hazard. Conversely, when the scope of social insurance is well defined, supplementary
insurance can generate efficient offset effects and avoid reverse redistribution.
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2 The model
2.1 Households
In this model, there are n individuals, with i = 1, ..., n, who face two states j = s, h: being sick (s ),
with a probability φi, and being healthy (h ) , with a probability 1− φi. The odds of being sick is an
exogenous variable and can be observed by all. The productivity (wi ) is heterogeneous, exogenous and
private information. The utility function u(.) is function of labour supply (lji ), the quantity of health
goods consumed (xi and zi, both equal to zero in the event of health) and the level of consumption of a
non-medical composite good (cji ). The expected utility function can be written:
U(.) = φiu(c
s
i , xi, zi, l
s
i ) + (1− φi)u(chi , 0, 0, lhi ). The non-medical good c faces a price normalized to
one. The social planner observes income wil
j
i .
Assumption 1: u is increasing and concave in cji (with j = h, s), xi and zi and decreasing in l
j
i . Labour
supply is lower in the sick state than in the healthy state.
In this model, there are two different types of medical goods. The first health good (x ) is insured by
social insurance, it has a unit price p (with p positive). The second health good (z) is not insured by
social insurance, but by private supplementary insurances only, and has a unit price r (with r positive).
The criteria used to define which good should be socially insured are important and outside the scope
of this article.
There are three sources to finance the costs of x and z: social insurance, private insurance, and
households’ out-of-pockets. Social insurance offers the same rate of coverage to each individual and is
financed through taxes. To cover the risk that the remaining expenditure represents, individuals can
chose ex-ante (before they learn in which state they will be in) to purchase a private insurance
contract. Complementary insurance offers coverage on remaining health expenses of good x and
supplementary insurance offers coverage on the cost of good z . The residual out-of-pocket rate for the
health good x is referred to as qcpli , respectively q
spl
i for the health good z. In other words, individuals
face the prices qcpli p and q
spl
i r when they choose to buy a unit of respectively x or z. Provision of
insurance decreases these prices.
Assumption 2: x and z are normal goods, the demand for health goods is negatively related to prices.
In other words, exi,qcpli
< 0 and ezi,qspli
< 0, with exi,qcpli
and ezi,qspli
, the price elasticity of health good
x, and the price elasticity of health good z. pqcpl and rqspl are the prices that individuals face for
respectively the health goods x and z, with p and r exogenous constant variables. The direct and
crossed price elasticities are: exi,qcpli
= ∂xi
∂qcpli
qcpli
xi
; ezi,qspli
= ∂zi
∂qspli
qspli
zi
; exi,qspli
= ∂xi
∂qspli
qspli
xi
;
ezi,qspli
= ∂zi
∂qcpli
qcpli
zi
. There is no assumption on the sign of exi,qspli
and ezi,qcpli
. The two health goods
will be complementary if exi,qspli
< 0 and substitute if exi,qspli
> 0.
When social coverage varies, individuals can adjust their private insurance contracts. The sensitivity of
this type of adjustment is measured by the elasticities σαβ and σαγ , with α, β and γ the respective
rates of social, complementary and supplementary insurance.
σαβ =
∂xi/∂βi
∂xi/∂α
α
βi
and σαγ =
∂zi/∂γi
∂zi/∂α
α
γi
.
Assumption 3: For calculative reasons, we consider that we are in a simplified Feldstein (1972)
4
framework. This partial equilibrium analysis implies that labour is not influenced by health insurance
prices and there is no income effect on health care. In other terms, dl¯idα = 0 and
dxi
dt =
dzi
dt =
dxi
dM =
dzi
dM = 0.
2.2 The insurance sector
2.2.1 Social insurance
Following the classification from Boadway et al. (2006), the rationale for public intervention in the field
of insurance is threefold: lower transactions costs (including administrative costs), market failures
(from asymmetric information) and redistribution. In our setting, social insurance can be a means of
redistribution as, by assumption, the social planner cannot differentiate income taxes according to risk.
No assumption was made on the correlation between risk and income. It is negative (respectively
positive), if low income households have higher (lower) expenditure levels for the socially insured health
goods than individuals with high income, and social insurance will be redistributive (regressive).
Social insurance is financed through a classical linear payroll tax. Individuals will pay T j = twil
j
i −M ,
according to their state of health j. The tax rate on labour supply (t) is identical for all individuals.
The lump sum transfers (M) can be positive or negative in order to represent the possible
non-proportional nature of the tax. The social planner provides social insurance for the health good x
at a rate α , (with 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 ) identical for all individuals. If an individual i is sick, the total expenses
covered by social insurance for this consumer is Ai = αpxi. There are n individuals in the society,
therefore the total cost of social insurance is
∑n
i=1 φiAi .
The social planner has one objective: maximising the welfare function that is defined as the unweighted
sum of each individual utility in the society.
maxα,t,M W =
∑n
i=1 Ui
st α
∑n
i=1 φipxi = t
∑n
i=1 wili − nM , with µ the Lagrange multiplier of the corresponding maximisation
program.
The government’s budget constraint is such that the total expenditure in social insurance is equal to
the receipt from the linear payroll tax:∑n
i=1 φiAi = t
∑n
i=1 φiwil
s
i + (1− φi)wilhi − nM
⇒ α∑ni=1 φipxi = t∑ni=1 wi l¯i − nM ⇒ αpx = twl −M
Denoting averages with a bar, for example, l¯i = φil
s
i + (1− φi)lhi ;
x¯i = φix
s
i + (1− φi)xhi = φixi + (1− φi)0; x = 1n
∑n
i=1 x¯i.
2.2.2 Private insurance
In this setting, complementary and supplementary insurance apply to the same risk of being sick (with
a probability φi). Complementary insurance offers coverage on remaining health expenses (1− α)pxi at
a premium picpli and supplementary insurance offers coverage on rzi at a premium pi
spl
i . These contracts
are characterized by their rate of insurance (βi and γi , with 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1) and their
5
premiums (picpli and pi
spl
i ). Premiums vary according to individuals’ risks; as private insurances evolve
on a competitive market the premiums are considered fair, i.e. PHIs make zero profit.
Premiums of complementary and supplementary insurance are actuarial, with βi and γi the insurance
rates of health goods x and z: picpli = φi(1−α)βip and pispli = φiγir. Bcpli = βi(pxi−Ai) = βi(1−α)pxi
and Bspli = γirzi, with B
cpl
i and B
spl
i the total expenses covered by private insurance.
Households finance social and private insurance through taxes and premiums in both health states.
When they are sick, they face the remaining health expenditure not covered by insurances, Ri.
Ri = Di −Ai −Bi = (1− α)(1− βi)pxi + (1− γi)rzi = qcpli pxi + qspli rzi, with qcpli and qspli the
out-of-pocket coefficient rates. Once premiums have been paid their cost is sunk and insurance
contracts reduce the prices individual face for the health goods xi and zi to q
cpl
i p and q
spl
i r.
2.3 The timing of the model
The game has three sequential steps and is resolved through backward induction. The outcomes of the
previous steps are anticipated making the equilibrium sub-game perfect. First, the social planner
defines the optimal rate of social insurance (α∗) by maximising the social welfare function. In the
second stage, individuals anticipate social coverage and choose a private contract with a supplementary
and a complementary component. At this stage, individuals vary according to their productivity (wi)
and their risk of becoming sick (φi ). The information on productivity is private, and the level of risk is
known by all. In the last step it is revealed in which state of nature each individual is and they define
their optimal individual level of labour supply, consumption of health and other goods.
The sections follow the anti-chronological order of the resolution. Section 3.1 studies the maximisation
program of the households once the state is known, Section 3.2 analyses the choice of private insurance
contracts, Section 4 presents the social planner’s choices and Section 5 concludes.
3 The households’ choices
3.1 The households’ choice of labour and consumption
In the third stage, it is assumed that premiums are sunk and taxes are given. Individuals maximise
their utility with respect to the endogenous variables li , ci (plus xi and zi when sick). Premiums being
exogenous, the choice of health consumption levels will depend exclusively on prices pqcpli and rq
spl
i .
Individuals maximise their utility under their budget constraints. When they are healthy, the
consumption of the non-health good is equal to their income plus the lump-sum transfer, net from
taxes and of the cost of the private insurance premium. chi = wi(1− t)lhi +M − picpli xi − pispli zi. When
they are ill, this income is used to buy health goods and other goods.
csi + q
cpl
i pxi + q
spl
i rzi = wi(1− t)lsi +M − picpli xi − pispli zi.
According to Assumption 1, labour supply is higher in the healthy state than in the sick state and
marginal utility decreases with consumption. Consequently, csi < c
h
i and the associated marginal utility
of income will be higher when sick than when healthy.
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The optimal choice of the consumer results from the maximisation of the expected utility. By
rearranging these First Order Conditions (FOC) we obtain the following optimality conditions:
∂u
∂chi
wi(1− t) + ∂u
∂lhi
= 0 (1)
∂u
∂csi
wi(1− t)+ ∂u
∂lsi
= 0 (2)
∂u
∂xi
− pqcpli
∂u
∂csi
= 0 (3)
∂u
∂zi
− rqspli
∂u
∂csi
= 0 (4)
The optimal quantities of labour supply and consumption of health goods and non-health goods satisfy
the conditions given by equations (1) to (4).
From (1) to (4) we obtain several results of comparative static, presented in Lemma 1. Denoting from
now on derivatives with a subscript
(
∂xi
∂α = xα
)
and ρj = ∂u∂cj the marginal utility of the non-health
good.
Lemma 1. .
(i) ∂xi∂α = −
∂2us
∂xi∂α
+p(1−βi)ρs
∂2us
∂xi2
> 0
(ii) ∂xi∂βi = −
∂2us
∂xi∂βi
+p(1−α)ρs
∂2us
∂xi2
> 0
(iii) ∂zi∂γi = −
∂us
∂zi∂γi
+rρs
∂2us
∂zi2
> 0
(iv) The elasticity between social and complementary insurance rates is equal to:
σαβ =
∂x
∂α/
∂x
∂βi
α/βi
= βiα
∂2us
∂xi∂α
+p(1−βi)ρs
∂2us
∂xi∂βi
+p(1−α)ρs .
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Lemma 1 indicates that consumption of health goods increases with their insurance coverage.
3.2 The household’s choice of private insurance
In the second stage, individuals choose their private coinsurance (βi and γi) among a choice of adapted
competitive contracts. During the previous step, the optimal levels of consumption according to
parameters βi, γi , α ,t and M were found and described by the optimality conditions (1) to (4). By
introducing these variables in the utility function we obtain the expected indirect utility function:
7
vi = max φiu(c
s
i , xi, zi, l
s
i ) + (1− φi)u(chi , 0, 0, lhi ). The optimal private rates of private insurance are
the results of the maximisation of their expected indirect utility function, with α, t and M exogenous
variables at this stage.
The private insurance problem is solved thanks to the following maximisation program:
Maxβi,γi v(α, βi, γi, t,M) = φiu(c
s
i , xi, zi, l
s
i ) + (1− φi)u(chi , 0, 0, lhi ).
β∗i and γ
∗
i are solutions of
∂v
∂βi
= 0 and ∂v∂γi = 0 with:
∂v
∂βi
= −[ρs − ρ¯]∂q
cpl
i
∂βi
px¯i − ρ¯(picpli xβ + pispli zβ) (5)
∂v
∂γi
= −[ρs − ρ¯]∂q
cpl
i
∂γi
rz¯i − ρ¯(picpli xγ + pispli zγ) (6)
Lemma 2 presents some results when derivating by the private insurance rates and is proven in
Appendix 2.
Lemma 2. xi and zi are normal goods, their consumption increases when their price goes down and the
sign of the cross derivatives vary according to if goods are complementary or supplementary.
(i) ∂xi∂βi = −(1− α)xqcpl
(ii) ∂xi∂γi = −xqspl
(iii) ∂zi∂βi = −(1− α) zqcpl
(iv) ∂zi∂γi = −zqspl
Equalizing equations (5) and (6) to zero and rearranging the terms we obtain the optimality conditions
presented by equations (7) and (8).
Cov(ρ, pxi) = ρ¯φiβipxβ + ρ¯φi
γi
(1− α)rzβ (7)
Cov(ρ, rzi) = ρ¯φi(1− α)βipxγ + ρ¯φiγirzγ (8)
With Cov(ρ, pxi) = φipxi(ρ
s − ρ¯) and Cov(ρ, rzi) = φirzi(ρs − ρ¯) the risk-sharing gains of insurance.
Lemma 3. Optimal positive interior conditions for private insurance rates β∗ and γ∗ are given by
equations (7) and (8). The optimal rates of complementary and supplementary insurance are such that
the gain of private insurance is equal to the expected loss from the marginal cost of moral hazard. Private
coverage is positively related to the utility of reducing income dispersion and negatively linked to moral
hazard.
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Out-of-pocket payments in the sick state create income dispersion between the two health states which
is costly to risk averse individuals. The first terms of equations (5) and (6) and the term on the Left
Hand Side (LHS from now on) of equations (7) and (8) express the gain caused by the reduction of the
risk, in terms of income dispersion. Cov(ρ, pxi) and Cov(ρ, rzi) are positive as the utility of income is
increasing and concave and the marginal utility of income is higher when sick than when healthy
(Assumption 1). Note, private insurance, by decreasing the difference in income between the sick and
healthy state generates risk-sharing gains, without redistributing between individuals who face a low
risk (φi low) and those who face a high risk of sickness (φi high).
The second terms of equations (5) and (6) and the Right Hand Side (RHS from now on) of equations
(7) and (8) express the cost of moral hazard. The first best solution (i.e. the optimum in a setting with
no moral hazard) is achieved when the effects of consumption on premiums are taken into account by
consumers. In this setting, by increasing private insurance rates, the perceived cost of health goods xi
and zi have gone down and their consumption consequently increased, generating inefficiently high
premiums. This increase in premiums results in a lower coverage; β∗ and γ∗ are negatively related to
price elasticities and moral hazard are high than when they are low. When goods are inelastic to price,
the first best solution is achieved and optimal insurance is reached. In this case, full insurance is
optimal.
After solving the system given by equations (7) and (8), we find the optimal values:
β∗i =
Cov(ρ, pxi)zγ
ρ¯φip(xβzγ − xγzβ) −
Cov(ρ, rzi)zβ
ρ¯φip(1− α)(xβzγ − xγzβ)
γ∗i =
Cov(ρ, rzi)xβ
ρ¯φip(xβzγ − xγzβ) −
Cov(ρ, pxi)zγ
ρ¯φip(xβzγ − xγzβ)
In the likely case that demand for a health good is more sensitive to its own insurance than the
insurance of the other health good (i.e.: |xβ | > |xγ | and |zγ | > |zβ | ), then xβzγ > xγzβ and β∗i and γ∗i
are defined.
Proposition 1. When x and z are substitutes, some private coverage will always be optimal, with β∗ > 0
and γ∗ > 0 .
Proof. Private insurance is always positive when x and z are substitutes: Space Space Space Space
Cov(ρ,pxi)zγ
ρ¯φip(xβzγ−xγzβ)−
Cov(ρ,rzi)zβ
ρ¯φip(1−α)(xβzγ−xγzβ) > 0⇔ βi > 0 and
Cov(ρ,rzi)xβ
ρ¯φip(xβzγ−xγzβ)−
Cov(ρ,pxi)zγ
ρ¯φip(xβzγ−xγzβ) > 0⇔ γi > 0.
As Cov(ρ, pxi), ρ¯φipxβ , Cov(ρ, rzi), ρ¯φiγirzγ are all positive, the first terms,
Cov(ρ,pxi)zγ
ρ¯φip(xβzγ−xγzβ) and
Cov(ρ,rzi)xβ
ρ¯φip(xβzγ−xγzβ) are positive. Similarly,
Cov(ρ,rzi)
ρ¯φip(1−α)(xβzγ−xγzβ) > 0 and
Cov(ρ,pxi)zγ
ρ¯φip(xβzγ−xγzβ) > 0. It follows
the sign of the second term is function of zβ and xγ . When zβ < 0 and xγ < 0 (i.e. when health goods
are substitutes), then the second terms are positive.
In this case, risk averse individuals will acquire some coverage (β∗ > 0 and γ∗ > 0) – even if the
price-elasticity is positive and insurance generates moral hazard.
Full-insurance, β∗ = 1 and γ∗ = 1, can be optimal, even in the presence of moral hazard, if the
difference between the valuation of marginal utility when sick and healthy is large enough (when
Cov(ρ, pxi) > ρ¯φiβipxβ + ρ¯φi
γi
(1−α)rzβ). These findings are in line with the literature on the trade-offs
between risk aversion and moral hazard.
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Conditions (7) and (8) implicitly define the optimal private coverage: βi(α, t,M) and γi(α, t,M). As in
Petretto (1999), we assume that the partial derivative ∂βi∂α is negative, making complementary and
social insurance strategic substitutes. At the second margin, social insurance crowds out
complementary insurance.
Interactions between private insurances are measured by the second term of the RHS. As McGuire
(2011, p.351) underlined, when studying the optimal insurance rate, the effect of other insured, and
therefore “overused”, goods must be accounted for. The contribution of the model is to identify and
distinguish the effect of interactions between complementary and supplementary contracts. The effect
varies according to the relations between goods. When xi and zi are complementary, a rise in one
private insurance rate will generate moral hazard and raise both premiums. When xi and zi are
substitutes, the second private coverage decreases premiums. A rise in one health good insurance rate
would provoke efficient offset effects: the consumption of the other good would decrease leading to
lower out-of-pockets and premium levels for both health goods. Consequently, private coverage will be
higher when goods are substitutes, and lower when they are complementary.
Proposition 2. When xi and zi are substitutes, complementary insurance has an efficient offset effect
on supplementary contracts and supplementary insurance has an efficient offset effect on complementary
contracts.
Proof. When xi and zi are substitutes, xγ and zβ are negative, and the second RHS term effects ρ¯pi
spl
i rzβ
and ρ¯picpli pxγ are negative.
In presence of ex-post moral hazard, households do not anticipate the impact their extra consumption
will have on premiums. Similarly, individuals do not anticipate that their coverage of one health good
will offset the consumption of the other health good and consequently decrease their premium.
4 The Social planner’s choices
At this stage, parameters α, t and M are yet to be determined. The social planner anticipates the
results of the previous stages. We assume a simple, unweighted, utilitarist function W =
∑
vi
maximised under the social budget constraint.
Section 4.1 presents the optimal rate of social insurance α∗ that maximises social welfare and Section
4.2 the optimal rate t∗ and transfer M∗ of the tax system.
4.1 The optimal social insurance rate
Before giving the optimality condition, Lemma 4 presents the derivation results according to α of:
premiums, out-of-pocket levels and health consumption; the proof is in the Appendix 2.
Lemma 4. Space Space Space Space
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(i)
∂qcpli
∂α = −1 + βi(1 + 1−αα σαβ)
(ii)
∂picpli
∂α = −φiβi(1 + 1−αα σαβ)p
(iii) ∂xi∂α = [βi(1 +
1−α
α σαβ)− 1]xqcpl
(iv) picplα = −φi(qcplα + 1)
(v)
∂qspli
∂α = −γα γiα σαγ
(vi)
∂pispli
∂α = −φi γiα σαγr
(vii) ∂zi∂α =
γi
α σαγzqspl
(viii) pisplα = −φiqsplα
By maximising the objective function with respect to α we obtain:
n∑
i=1
vα = µ
n∑
i=1
φipxi + µα
n∑
i=1
φipxα (9)
As,
vα = ρ¯px¯i + (ρ¯− ρs)qcplα px¯i + (ρ¯− ρs)qsplα rz¯i − ρ¯picpli pxα − ρ¯pispli rzα (10)
equation (9) can be rearranged:
n∑
i=1
Cov(b¯; qcplα px¯i) +
n∑
i=1
Cov(b¯; qsplα rz¯i) + n
(
b¯+ b¯Cov
(
bi
b¯
,
xi
x¯
)
− 1
)
px¯
+n
(
b¯+ b¯Cov
(
bi
b¯
,
zi
z¯
))
rz¯ =
n∑
i=1
αφipxα +
n∑
i=1
b¯picpli pxα +
n∑
i=1
b¯pispli rzα (11)
With bji =
ρji
µ , and b¯i =
1
n
∑n
i=1 φib
s
i + (1− φi)bhi the private marginal utility of the other good’s
consumption; Cov(b¯, qcplα px¯i) = φiq
cpl
α px¯i(b
s − b¯) and Cov(b¯, qcplα pz¯i) = φiqcplα pz¯i(bs − b¯) the social
risk-sharing gains of social insurance; Cov
(
bi
b¯
, xix¯
)
= 1n
∑n
i=1
bi
b¯
xi
x¯ − 1 and
Cov
(
bi
b¯
, ziz¯
)
= 1n
∑n
i=1
bi
b¯
zi
z¯ − 1 distributive factors of health expenditure, as defined in the literature of
indirect taxation.
Lemma 5. The positive interior condition for the optimal rate of social insurance α∗ verifies equation
(11). α is optimal when the social gain from risk sharing and the social redistribution gain are equal to
the social cost of moral hazard.
Social coverage is positively related to the gain of risk-sharing, redistribution, and negatively related to
moral hazard.
The first effect of increasing social insurance is to reduce the variation between the states of natures, of
the remaining cost of the health good x. The decrease in income variation that social insurance
provides is the social risk sharing gain. It is captured by the first two terms
∑n
i=1 Cov(b¯; q
cpl
α ¯pxi) and∑n
i=1 Cov(b¯; q
spl
α rz¯i), the sum of differences between the marginal utility of income of the expected
out-of-pocket expense of good x and z, and the marginal utility of income of the out-of-pocket cost in
case of sickness.
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The right hand side is equal to the social marginal cost of moral hazard. There are two types of moral
hazard effects. α
∑n
i=1 φipxα expresses the negative effect of an increase in social insurance on the
government’s budget constraint. The second form of moral hazard (
∑n
i=1 b¯pi
cpl
i pxα and
∑n
i=1 b¯pi
spl
i rzα)
is the sum of the impact of the increase of coverage on the individual’s premiums.
The third component of the LHS expresses the social redistribution gain from social insurance. It has
the form of a normalised covariance between social MUI and health expenditure. The covariance
between the net social marginal utility of income and the share of consumer i in the total consumption
of health goods, Cov
(
bi
b¯
, xix¯
)
, is greater for goods that are heavily consumed by individuals with a high
net social marginal utility of income. As analysed by Salanie´ (2011), because of the concave shape of
the utility function, ”these agents, who are privileged by the government in its objective function, are
likely also the poorest”. α varies according to the relation between the distribution of income and
health expenditure px¯. α will be highest when they are strongly positively related, i.e. when the
poorest individuals who consume few other goods are the ones who spend on average the most on the
good x. Even in the presence of some moral hazard, full social insurance can be optimal if the
redistributive gains are high enough. Note, because individuals with low incomes have a higher value of
marginal utility of consumption, the social planner favours low income individuals, even when its
objective function is an unweighted sum. Barigozzi (2006) studies the case with homogenous
individuals. In this case Cov
(
bi
b¯
, xix¯
)
= 0 and there is no gain from redistribution.
Proposition 3. When the consumption of the health good x is negatively correlated to income, social
insurance is redistributive and α∗ > 0. When reverse distribution is strong, the high-income individuals
buy more x than the low-income group and α∗ = 0.
Proof. In the absence of supplementary insurance, equation (11) can be rewritten:
∑n
i=1 Cov(b¯; q
cpl
α px¯i)+
n
(
b¯+ b¯Cov
(
bi
b¯
, xix¯
)− 1) px¯ = ∑ni=1 αφipxα +∑ni=1 b¯picpli pxα.
When consumption of the health good x and income are negatively correlated, Cov
(
bi
b¯
, xix¯
)
> 0, if∑n
i=1 Cov(b¯; q
cpl
α px¯i) >
∑n
i=1 b¯pi
cpl
i pxα, then
∑n
i=1 Cov(b¯;q
cpl
α px¯i)+n
(
b¯+b¯Cov
(
bi
b¯
,
xi
x¯
)
−1
)
px¯−∑ni=1 b¯picpli pxα∑n
i=1 φipxα
>
0⇒ α∗ > 0.
Conversely, when social insurance is regressive, Cov
(
bi
b¯
, xix¯
)
< 0, the optimal coverage is null. When∑n
i=1 Cov(b¯;q
cpl
α px¯i)+n
(
b¯+b¯Cov
(
bi
b¯
,
xi
x¯
)
−1
)
px¯−∑ni=1 b¯picpli pxα∑n
i=1 φipxα
< 0⇒ α∗ = 0.
Finally, optimal full social coverage can exist, even in the presence of moral hazard if the gains of
redistribution and risk sharing are high enough.
When
∑n
i=1 Cov(b¯;q
cpl
α px¯i)+n
(
b¯+b¯Cov
(
bi
b¯
,
xi
x¯
)
−1
)
px¯−∑ni=1 b¯picpli pxα∑n
i=1 φipxα
> 1⇒ α∗ = 1.
The correlation between income and consumption of the socially insured health good is central. There
will be no social coverage when the health good is regressive.
As in Barigozzi (2006), optimal social coverage is null if individuals are homogenous.
Proposition 4. The optimal social insurance rate α∗ is higher in an exclusive system without comple-
mentary insurance.
Proof. Complementary insurance decreases the effect of the social risk sharing gain and increases moral
hazard, thus reducing α∗. In the previous section, the risk sharing gain of private insurance was in-
dependent from social insurance, Cov(ρ; pxi). Because of the timing of the model, this result is not
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symmetrical and we find here that, even after simplification, the gain of risk sharing of social insurance
Cov(b¯; qcplα px¯i) is proportional to the size of the out-of-pocket rate and is therefore decreasing in βi.
The impact of α on individuals’ out-of-pocket level will be strongest when there is no complementary
insurance or, when the elasticity between private and public insurance is weak.
Following the classification from Boadway et al. (2006), the rationale for public intervention in the field
of insurance, are: transactions costs (administrative costs), market failures (from asymmetric
information) and redistribution. Proposition 3 underlines the central role of redistribution in the
optimality of social insurance.
The relation between the health goods x and z is what distinguishes complementary and
supplementary insurance.
Proposition 5. Supplementary insurance has an offset effect resulting in an increase of α∗ when x and
z are substitutes; it increases moral hazard and thus reduces α∗ when x and z are complementary.
Proof. When health goods x and z are substitutes, supplementary insurance will generate efficient offset
effects, reducing consumption of x while increasing α∗. Conversely, when health goods are complemen-
tary, private coverage will increase moral hazard. Consequently, the optimal α∗ will be higher when the
goods are substitutes than if they are complementary.
When health goods are substitutes, supplementary and complementary have opposite effects on
optimal social insurance. Confusing complementary and supplementary insurances can be detrimental
in the design of optimal insurance.
In a previous version of this model, we considered that PHIs had higher administrative costs than SHI.
Results of the previous model indicated that, when administrative costs are considered, the optimal
rate of private insurance is such that the gain of private insurance is equal to the expected loss from
the marginal cost of moral hazard and the cost of administrative costs. In the first best scenario, when
administrative costs exceed a certain threshold, full insurance is no longer optimal. Conversely, in this
setting, social insurance coverage (measured by α) is positively related to private administrative costs.
These results are in line with findings from Boadway et al. (2006), administrative costs increase the
rationale for SHI coverage. Because this specification did not add any novel results, we chose for
simplicity not to include administrative costs.
4.2 The optimal tax structure
According to the maximisation program, the optimal tax rate t∗ and transfer M∗ are the solutions of
respectively dΨdt = 0 and
dΨ
dM = 0 , which gives us:
a¯− 1
n
Cov(b, qcplβ px¯iβM + q
cpl
γ rz¯iγM ) = 1 (12)
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t1− t = −
∑n
i=1 Cov(b, q
cpl
β px¯iβt + q
spl
γ rz¯iγt) + nwl(a¯Cov
(
ai
a¯ ,
wili
w¯l
)
+ a¯− 1)∑n
i=1 wilill
(13)
With ai =
du
dyi
1
µ +
∑n
i=1 tiwilM the net social marginal utility of income (MUI), it is equal to the social
MUI net from the extra tax caused by the extra income. When individuals are healthy, the marginal
utility of consumption is equal to the MUI (yhi = c
h
i ). This identity does not hold when ill
(ysi = c
s
i + q
cplpxi + q
splrzi). With a¯ =
1
n
∑n
i=1 ai.
With l¯l =
∂l¯
∂wi(1−t)
wi(1−t)
l¯
= S wi(1−t)
l¯
the elasticity of the expected labour supply;
Cov
(
ai
a¯ ,
wili
w¯l
)
= 1n
∑n
i=1
ai
a¯
wili
w¯l
− 1 the covariance between the expected social MUI and the expected
gross labour income across individuals - a distributional characteristic of income distribution as
presented by Feldstein (1972).
Lemma 6. Positive interior conditions for the tax rate t∗ and transfer M∗ are given by equation (12)
and (13).
The lump sum transfer M∗ is optimal when the net social valuation of the transfer of $1 is equal to the
cost of that transfer plus the gain of risk-sharing for the extra out-of-pocket expenditure.
The optimal tax rate t∗ follows the Ramsey tax rule, that is, t∗ is inversely proportional to the compensated
elasticity of labour. It is function of the distribution of income (of the variation of the valuation of w)
and of the risk sharing loss caused by the reduction of out-of-pocket expenditure caused by t.
Equations (13) and (14) follow the usual interpretation of optimal linear income taxation. We cannot
exclude a corner solution.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
5 Conclusion
In 2013 the French Council of Economic Analysis (CAE) proposed to forbid re-insuring co-payments of
social insurance, thereby offering to restrict topping up activities to supplementary insurance only
(Askenasy et al., 2013).
In this article, we set out to explore whether complementary and supplementary insurances had the
same impact on social coverage, and to see if there was a case for banning complementary insurance. In
order to do this, we adapted a health insurance model, in presence of moral hazard by introducing a
second health good. Thereby making it possible to study the interactions between complementary,
supplementary and social insurance.
We find that, when the correlation between income and consumption of the health good is positive,
social insurance would be regressive and the optimal social coverage is null, resulting in an exclusive
private system. Conversely, when the correlation is positive, optimal social coverage is positive and can
be equal to one when price elasticity is low. Consequently, optimal mixed systems with complementary
insurance will arise solely when social insurance is redistributive and health demand is elastic.
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The main contribution of this article is to give evidence that complementary and supplementary
insurances can have opposing interactions with social insurance and should therefore be distinguished
from one another. Compared to an exclusive system, complementary insurance increases moral hazard
and decreases the beneficial effects of social insurance, resulting in lower coverage of social insurance
and consequently lower redistribution. On the other hand, when health goods are substitutes,
supplementary insurance will have a positive offset effect resulting in an increase in social coverage.
When health goods are complementary, supplementary insurance acts in a similar way to
complementary insurance, generating ex-post moral hazard and decreasing optimal social coverage.
The efficiency of the offset effects of private insurance on social insurance are determined by the sign of
the interactions. We offer to illustrate these effects using examples from the market of eyewear. In our
example, we consider that social insurance participation is restricted to covering part of the cost of
eyeglass lenses; complementary insurance covers eyeglass lenses and supplementary insurance finances
frames and contact lenses. Frames are complementary to eyeglass lenses whereas contact lenses are
substitutes. As the demand for lenses is elastic to price, complementary insurance generates inefficient
moral hazard, resulting in a lower optimal social insurance rate. Similarly, supplementary insurance of
frames generates inefficient offset effects resulting in inefficient extra-consumption of eyeglass lenses.
However, supplementary insurance of contact lenses causes positive offset effects on eyeglass lenses,
resulting in an increase of the optimal social insurance rate. In other words, the social insurance rate
for eyeglass lenses will be lower if complementary insurance is allowed and when supplementary
insurance covers frames; conversely, the social insurance rate for eyeglass lenses will increase when
supplementary insurance covers lenses.
Our findings are consistent with past articles. As in Barigozzi (2006), when insuring the health good
yields no redistribution gain, social insurance coverage should be null. As in Petretto (1999), the
optimal rate of social insurance is positively related to the gain of risk sharing and redistribution and is
also negatively related to moral hazard. Consistent with Boadway et al. (2006), the rationale for social
insurance are redistribution and relative administrative efficiency between social and private insurance.
These results give ground to the choice made by many countries to ban private insurance from
re-insuring social co-pays. In countries where complementary insurance is widespread, banning
complementary insurance seems difficult. In this case, reaching towards full social insurance on some
health goods and suppressing SHI contribution for other health expenditure can be considered. When
considering whether to ban complementary insurance or not, the composition of the social health
bundle is crucial. One of the limits of this model is to include only two health goods (one covered by
social insurance and one that is not). Selection considerations are outside the scope of our analysis.
Our results suggest that the goods that should be put in priority inside the social bundle should be
foremost valued by lower income households and have weak price sensitivity (necessary treatments
rather than comfort health goods). These findings complement
(? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )
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Type of insurance system OECD Countries
Supplementary insurance only Australia, Canada, the Netherlands,
Sweden and Switzerland
Supplementary and Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
complementary insurance France, Germany, Korea, Luxembourg and Portugal
Duplicative systems Australia, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal,
Spain and the United Kingdom
No private health insurance Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland,
Norway, Slovak Republic and Turkey
Table 1: A classification of OECD countries according to their private insurance systems.
Appendix
Appendix 1: Analysis of health expenditure according to the insurance
systems
A classification of countries according to the insurance systems
In addition to complementary and supplementary systems, mixed systems can take a duplicative form,
also known as opting out. In this setting, individuals can decide to renounce socially covered insurance
and consume a private alternative. Private insurance covers the costs of alternative goods that are
outside of the social contract, but individuals must pay for social insurance regardless.
As presented in Table 1, according to the most recent data from the OECD (Paris et al., 2016), there
are nine countries with supplementary and complementary insurance; five countries with
supplementary insurance only; ten countries with duplicative private insurances; six countries with no
private health insurance. There are no countries where complementary insurance exists without the
presence of supplementary insurance.
Among the fourteen countries where supplementary insurance exists, covering cost-sharing expenses
through a complementary contract is allowed in nine countries only.
Two example of complex topping up systems are France and the United States. In France, most health
goods, including psychotropic medications, are covered in part by social insurance. Apart from a two
euro co-pay per prescription that cannot be re-insured by private insurance companies, the remaining
costs may be covered by a complementary insurance contract. On the other hand, other goods such as
psychotherapy sessions or ostheopathy are not covered by social insurance and can be privately insured
with a supplementary contract. Contracts often combine both types of insurance and enrolees are not
aware of this distinction. In France 95% of the populations have a complementary contract.
Complementary systems are present and developing in other countries but, as in the United States,
only affect part of the population. For instance, Medicare patients can be covered by complementary
and supplementary contracts. Since 1996, the Medicare plan offers social insurance to Americans over
65 who have contributed to its funding. A variety of contracts known as Medigap, offer complementary
insurance to cover part of the co-payments left by Medicare. Until 2006, Medicare did not cover any
costs related to drugs. Pensioners who wished to insure against this risk could buy specific Medigap
contracts which offered this supplementary component.
Health expenditure and outcomes according to the insurance systems
18
Table 2 presents statistics of health expenditure and health outcomes in the OECD according to private
insurance systems. These descriptive statistics do not account for other factors that can influence these
outcomes (GDP, environmental factors, how health providers are contracted or regulated...).
These statistics reveal a lack of significant difference in life expectancy of the total population across
mixed systems of health insurance and an unclear effect on total cost. Overall, public and total health
expenditure are higher in countries with supplementary insurance. Indicators of health consumption
and life expectancy are also higher. Intuitively, complementary insurance should reduce out-of-pocket
levels but increase moral hazard. The evidence shows that indeed, out-of-pocket levels are lower in
countries with complementary insurance than in topping up countries with supplementary insurance
only (respectively $46 and $612 a year and per capita). There also seems to be evidence of
extra-consumption: the number of Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Computed Tomography Scans,
and the average length of stay in hospital are consistently higher. More surprisingly, the overall level of
private funding in countries with both supplementary and complementary insurance is lower than in
countries with supplementary insurance only. The level of social insurance is higher in countries with
complementary insurance. The annual growth rate of public spending is lower in countries with
complementary insurance, suggesting a greater possibility of transferring social spending onto
complementary insurance.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of health expenditure in the OECD according to private insurance systems
(Source: Paris et al., 2010).
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Appendix 2: Proofs
First Order Conditions
The budget constraints can be written consumption equal to resources:
chi = wi(1− t)lhi +M − picpli xi − pispli zi when individuals are healthy and
csi + q
cpl
i pxi + q
spl
i rzi = wi(1− t)lsi +M − picpli xi − pispli zi when they are sick.
The optimal level of labour, consumption of health and non-health goods are defined thanks to a
classical maximisation program. We propose to resolve that program using a Lagrangian; the
maximisation programs can be presented as follows:
In the healthy state:
Maxu(chi , 0, 0, l
h
i )
st chi = wi(1− t)lhi +M − picpli xi − pispli zi
L = u(chi , 0, 0, l
h
i ) + µ(c
h
i − wi(1− t)lhi −M + picpli xi + pispli zi)
In the sick state:
Maxu(csi , xi, zi, l
s
i )
st csi + q
cpl
i pxi + q
spl
i rzi = wi(1− t)lsi +M − picpli xi − pispli zi
L = u(csi , xi, zi, l
s
i ) + λ(c
s
i + q
cpl
i pxi + q
spl
i rzi − wi(1− t)lsi −M + picpli xi + pispli zi)
First Order Conditions in case of health:
FOC 1: ∂L
∂chi
= 0 ⇔ ∂u
∂chi
+ µ = 0 ⇔ µ = − ∂u
∂chi
FOC 2: ∂L
∂lhi
= 0 ⇔ ∂u
∂lhi
− µwi(1− t) = 0
We deduce relation (1) by substituting FOC 1 into FOC 2.
First Order Conditions in case of sickness:
FOC 1: ∂L∂csi
= 0 ⇔ ∂u∂csi + λ = 0 ⇔ λ = −
∂u
∂csi
FOC 2: ∂L∂lsi
= 0 ⇔ ∂u∂lsi − λwi(1− t) = 0
At this stage social health insurance structure is known and private insurance has already been
purchased:
∂picpli
∂xi
=
∂pispli
∂zi
= 0.
FOC 3: ∂L∂xi = 0 ⇔ ∂u∂xi + λpq
cpl
i = 0
FOC 4: ∂L∂zi = 0 ⇔ ∂u∂zi + λrq
spl
i = 0
Thanks to the first two order conditions, we deduce relation (1) and (2). Thanks to FOC 1 and 3, we
deduce relation (3). Thanks to FOC 1 and 4, we deduce relation (4).
Lemma 1
According to the implicit function theorem, if F (x(α), α) = 0 then, ∂x∂α = −∂F (x(α),α)/∂α∂F (x(α),α)/∂x .
The optimality conditions (equations (1) to (4)) give us five relations equal to zero and several results
of static comparative are derived.
F 1(xi(α), α) =
∂u
∂xi
− p(1− α)(1− βi) ∂u∂csi therefore,
∂xi
∂α = − ∂F
1(xi(α),α)/∂α
∂F 1(xi(α),α)/∂xi
= −
∂2us
∂xi∂α
+p(1−βi)ρs
∂2u
∂xi2
> 0.
F 1(xi(βi), βi) =
∂u
∂xi
− p(1− α)(1− βi) ∂u∂csi therefore,
∂xi
∂βi
= −∂F 1(xi(βi),βi)/dβi∂F 1(xi(βi),βi)/dxi = −
∂2u
∂xidβi
+p(1−α)ρs
∂2u
∂xi2
> 0.
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Consequently, ∂xi/∂α∂xi/∂βi =
∂2u
∂xi∂α
+p(1−βi)ρs
∂2u
∂xi∂βi
+p(1−α)ρs , which gives us:
σαβ =
∂x
∂α/
∂x
∂βi
α/βi
= βiα
∂2u
∂xi∂α
+p(1−βi)ρs
∂2u
∂xi∂βi
+p(1−α)ρs the elasticities between the social insurance rate and private
complementary insurance rate.
F 2(zi(γi), γi) =
∂u
∂zi
− r(1− γi) ∂u∂csi therefore,
∂zi
∂γi
= −∂F 2(zi(γi),γi)/∂γi∂F 2(zi(γi),γi)/∂zi = −
∂2u
∂zi∂γi
+rρs
∂2u
∂zi2
> 0.
F 3(csi (t), t) =
∂u
∂csi
wi(1− t)+ ∂u∂lsi therefore,
∂csi
∂t = − ∂F
3(csi (t),t)/∂t
∂F 3(csi (t),t)/∂c
s
i
=
wiρ
s− ∂2u
∂ls
i
∂t
∂2u
∂cs
i
2
< 0.
Lemma 2
Lemma 2 presents the impact of private insurance rates on out-of-pocket expenses, premiums and
health consumption.
Relations (i) to (iv) are derived using simple derivation of qcpli (β, γ), q
spl
i (β, γ), pi
cpl
i (β, γ), pi
spl
i (β, γ),
xi(β, q
cpl
i (β, γ), q
spl
i (β, γ)) and zi(β, q
cpl
i (β, γ), q
spl
i (β, γ)) by βi and γi; with:
∂xi
∂βi
= ∂xi
∂qcpli
∂qcpli
∂βi
+ ∂xi
∂qspli
∂qspli
∂βi
and ∂xi∂γi =
∂xi
∂qcpli
∂qcpli
∂γi
+ ∂xi
∂qspli
∂qspli
∂γi
.
Lemma 3
The optimality condition demands
∂v
∂βi
= φi
[
∂u
∂csi
∂csi
∂βi
+ ∂u∂lsi
∂lsi
∂βi
+ ∂u∂xi
∂xi
∂βi
+ ∂u∂zi
∂zi
∂βi
]
+ (1− φi)
[
∂u
∂chi
∂chi
∂βi
+ ∂u
∂lhi
∂lhi
∂βi
]
= 0
∂v
∂βi
= φi
∂u
∂csi
[
∂csi
∂lsi
∂lsi
∂βi
+
∂csi
∂picpli
∂picpli
∂βi
+
∂csi
∂pispli
∂pispli
∂βi
+
∂csi
∂xi
∂xi
∂βi
+
∂csi
∂zi
∂zi
∂βi
+
∂csi
∂qcpli
∂qcpli
∂βi
+
∂csi
∂qspli
∂qspli
∂βi
]
+φi
∂u
∂lsi
∂lsi
∂βi
+
φi
∂u
∂xi
∂xi
∂βi
+φi
∂u
∂zi
∂zi
∂βi
+(1−φi) ∂u∂chi
[
∂chi
∂lhi
∂lhi
∂βi
+
∂chi
∂picpli
∂picpli
∂βi
+
∂chi
∂pispli
∂pispli
∂βi
+
∂chi
∂xi
∂xi
∂βi
+
∂chi
∂zi
∂zi
∂βi
]
+(1−φi) ∂u∂lhi
∂lhi
∂βi
After simplifying using the FOCs presented in the equations (1) to (4), it follows:
∂v
∂βi
= −φiρsφi(1− α)pxi + φiρs(1− α)pxi − φiρspicpli pxβ − φiρspispli rzβ − (1− φi)ρhφi(1− α)pxi − (1−
φi)ρ
hpicpli pxi − (1− φi)ρhpispli rzβ
According to the optimality condition,
[ρs − ρ¯](1− α)px¯i − ρ¯φiγirzβ = 0
[ρs − ρ¯]φipxi(1− α) = ρ¯φi(1− α)βipxβ + ρ¯φiγirzβ ]
By definition, Cov(ρ, pxi) = ρ
sφipxi − ρ¯px¯i = ρsφipxi − ρ¯φipxi = (ρs − ρ¯)φipxi therefore:
Cov(ρ, pxi)(1− α) = ρ¯φi(1− α)βipxβ + ρ¯φiγirzβ
Cov(ρ, pxi) =
1
1−α ρ¯φi(1− α)βipxβ + 1(1−α) ρ¯φiγirzβ
Cov(ρ, pxi) = ρ¯φiβipxβ + ρ¯φi
γi
(1−α)rzβ (7)
Similarly, we find:
∂v
∂γi
= −φiρs
(
∂pispli
∂γi
+
∂qspli
∂γi
)
rzi − φiρspispli pzγ − φiρspicpli pxγ
−(1− φi)ρh
(
∂pispli
∂γi
rzi + pi
spl
i rzγ + pi
cpl
i pxγ
)
and Cov(ρ, rzi) = ρ¯φi(1− α)βipxγ + ρ¯φiγirzγ (8).
Lemma 4
Lemma 4 results from simple derivation.
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(i)
∂qcpli
∂α = −1 + βi − (1− α)βα = −1 + βi(1 + 1−αα σαβ)
(ii)
∂picpli
∂α = φi((1− α)βα − βi)p = −φiβi(1 + 1−αα σαβ)p
(iii) ∂xi∂α =
∂xi
∂qcpli
∂qcpli
∂α = [βi(1 +
1−α
α σαβ)− 1]xqcpl = [βi(1 + 1−αα σαβ)− 1]xqcpl
(iv) picplα = −φi(qcplα + 1)
(v)
∂qspli
∂α = −γα γiα σαγ
(vi)
∂pispli
∂α = φiγαr = −φi γiα σαγr
(vii) ∂zi∂α =
∂zi
∂qspli
∂qspli
∂αi
= −γαzqspl = γiα σαγzqspl
(viii) pisplα = −φiqsplα
Lemma 5
Maximising the objective function
Ψ =
∑n
i=1 vi − µ[α
∑n
i=1 φipxi − t
∑n
i=1 wi l¯i − nM ] according to α gives us: ∂Ψ∂α = 0.
∑n
i=1 vα = µ
∑n
i=1 φipxi + µα
∑n
i=1 φipxα (9)
With, ∂v∂α =
∂v
∂α +
∂v
∂β
∂β
∂α +
∂v
∂γ
∂γ
∂α = φi
∂u
∂α + (1− φi) ∂u∂α
(at the optimum ∂v∂βi =
∂v
∂γi
= 0).
∂v
∂α = φi
∂u
∂csi
[
∂csi
∂lsi
∂lsi
∂α +
∂csi
∂picpli
∂picpli
∂α +
∂csi
∂pispli
∂pispli
∂α +
∂csi
∂xi
∂xi
∂α +
∂csi
∂zi
∂zi
∂α +
∂csi
∂qcpli
∂qcpli
∂α +
∂csi
∂qspli
∂qspli
∂α
]
+ φi
∂u
∂lsi
∂lsi
∂α
+φi
∂u
∂xi
∂xi
∂α +φi
∂u
∂zi
∂zi
∂α +(1−φi) ∂u∂chi
[
∂chi
∂lhi
dlhi
dα +
∂chi
∂picpli
∂picpli
∂α +
∂chi
∂pispli
∂pispli
∂α +
∂chi
∂xi
∂xi
∂α +
∂chi
∂zi
∂zi
∂α
]
+(1−φi) ∂u∂lhi
∂lhi
∂α
Using the results obtained in Lemma 2:
∂v
∂α = −φiρs
[
pxi
∂picpli
∂α + rzi
∂pispli
∂α + pi
cpl
i p
∂xi
∂α + pi
spl
i r
∂zi
∂α + pxi
∂qcpli
∂α + rzi
∂qspli
∂α
]
−(1− φi)ρh
[
∂picpli
∂α pxi +
∂pispli
∂α rzi + p
∂xi
∂α pi
cpl
i + r
∂zi
∂α pi
spl
i
]
∂v
∂α = −ρ¯
(
pxi
∂picpli
∂α +
∂pispli
∂α rzi
)
− φiρsp
(
xi
∂qcpli
∂α + rzi
∂qspli
∂α
)
− ρ¯picpli pxα − ρ¯pispli rzα
By factorizing thanks to Lemma 4 (viii) we get:
∂v
∂α = ρ¯pxiφi(1 + q
cpl
α ) + ρ¯φiq
spl
α rzi − φiρs(pxi ∂q
cpl
i
∂α + rzi
∂qspli
∂α )− ρ¯picpli pxα − ρ¯pispli rzα
∂v
∂α = ρ¯px¯i + (ρ¯− ρs)qcplα px¯i + (ρ¯− ρs)qsplα rz¯i − ρ¯picpli pxα − ρ¯pispli rzα (˙10)
By introducing equation (10) in equation (9) and rearranging the terms we find:
-
∑n
i=1 ρ¯pi
cpl
i pxα −
∑n
i=1 ρ¯pi
spl
i rzα −
∑n
i=1 ρ¯pi
cpl
α pxi −
∑n
i=1 φiρ
sqcplα pxi = µp
∑n
i=1 φixi + µα
∑n
i=1 φipxα
By dividing by µ and adopting the following notation bs = ρ
s
µ ; b
h = ρ
h
µ and
b¯ = φbs + (1− φ)bh = φρs+(1−φ)ρhµ = ρ¯µ we get:
-
∑n
i=1 b¯pi
cpl
α pxi −
∑n
i=1 φib
sqcplα pxi − npx¯ =
∑n
i=1 αφipxiα + b¯pi
cpl
i pxiα +
∑n
i=1 b¯pi
spl
i rzα
Which can also be written:
∑n
i=1 Cov(b¯; q
cpl
α px¯i) +
∑n
i=1 Cov(b¯; q
spl
α rz¯i)− n
(
1− b¯− b¯Cov ( bi
b¯
, xix¯
))
px¯+
n
(
b¯+ b¯Cov
(
bi
b¯
, ziz¯
))
rz¯ =
∑n
i=1 αφipxα +
∑n
i=1 b¯pi
cpl
i pxα +
∑n
i=1 b¯pi
spl
i rzα
Lemma 6
The necessary condition for optimal rates t and M presented in Lemma 6 are solutions to the
equations: dΨdt = 0 and
dΨ
dM = 0.
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vi is the individuals indirect function solution of maximisation program Space space space space
vi(α, β
∗
i (α, t, M), γ
∗
i (α, t, M), t, M) = max u(ci, xi, zi, li)
According to the simplified Feldstein framework there is no income effect on health care demand
xM = zM = 0.
The individual’s budget constraint in both states is yji = wi(1− t)lji +M − picpli xi − pispli zi.
Therefore, the expenditure function can be written:
ei(ui, t,M) = wi(1− t)lj∗i +M − picpli x∗i − pispli z∗i .
∂v
∂M = vM + vββM + vγγM
∂v
∂M = vM − (ρs − ρ¯)qcplβ px¯iβM − ρ¯(picpli xβ + pispli zβ)βM − (ρs − ρ¯)qsplγ rz¯iγM − ρ¯(picpli xγ + pispli zγ)γM
∂v
∂M = vM − Cov(ρ, qcplβ px¯iβM + qcplγ rz¯iγM )
According to the envelope theorem:
∂Ψ
∂M =
∂
∂M
∑n
i=1 vi − µ ∂∂M [α
∑n
i=1 φipxi − t
∑n
i=1 wili + nM ] = 0∑n
i=1
∂v
∂M = µ
∑n
i=1
∂
∂M [αφipxi − twili +M ]∑n
i=1
vM
µ −
Cov(ρ, qcplβ px¯iβM+q
cpl
γ rz¯iγM )
µ =
∑n
i=1[−twilM + 1]∑n
i=1[
vM
µ + twilM ]− Cov(b, qcplβ px¯iβM + qcplγ rz¯iγM ) = n
According to Roy’s identity, vM = −∂ui∂yi ∂ei∂M = −∂ui∂yi .
By definition, the net social marginal utility of income is equal to the social MUI net from the extra tax
caused by the extra income. It can be written ai =
∂u
∂yi
1
µ + twilM with, a¯ =
1
n
∑n
i=1 ai. This gives us:
1
n
n∑
i=1
[− ∂u
∂yi
1
µ
+ twilM ]− 1
n
Cov(b, qcplβ px¯iβM + q
spl
γ rz¯iγM ) = 1
a¯− 1
n
Cov(b, qcplβ px¯iβM + q
cpl
γ rz¯iγM ) = 1 (12)
∂v
∂t = vt + vββt + vγγt
According to the simplified Feldstein framework there is no income effect on health care demand
xt = zt = 0.
∂v
∂t = vt − (ρs − ρ¯)qcplβ px¯iβt − ρ¯(picpli xβ + pispli zβ)βt − (ρs − ρ¯)qcplγ rz¯iγt − ρ¯(picpli xγ + pispli zγ)γt
∂v
∂t = vt − (ρs − ρ¯)[qcplβ px¯iβt + qsplγ rz¯iγt]
∂v
∂t = vt − Cov(ρi, qcplβ px¯iβt + qsplγ rz¯iγt)
The Slutsky equation allows to distinguish the effect of the change in net wage rate ωi into two
components. The first component is the compensated term which shows the substitution of the
quantity of labour when the net wage rate changes. It is also known as the Slutsky term, noted S . The
second term is the income effect. According to the Slutsky equation: ∂li∂ωi = (
∂li
∂ωi
)u¯ + li
∂li
∂Ii
= S + li
∂li
∂Ii
.
Therefore the effect of taxation on labour supply is ∂li∂ti = (S + li
∂li
∂Ii
)(−wi) + ∂li∂Ii ∂Ii∂ti = −wi(S + lilM ).
We obtain S = ll
li
wi(1−t) by rearranging the elasticity of labour supply:
ll =
∂li
∂wi(1−t)
wi(1−t)
li
= S wi(1−t)li .
By definition, the covariance between the expected social MUI and the expected gross labour income
across individuals is equal to:
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θ = Cov
(
ai
a¯ ,
wili
w¯l
)
= E
(
ai
a¯
wili
w¯l
)− E (aia¯ )E (wiliw¯l ) = 1n∑ni=1 aia¯ wiliw¯l − 1.
Therefore, na¯w¯lθ + na¯w¯l =
∑n
i=1 aiwili
∂Ψ
∂t =
∂
∂t
∑n
i=1 vi + µ
∑n
i=1
∂
∂t [αφipxi − twi l¯i +M ] = 0
∑n
i=1
∂v
∂t = −µ
∑n
i=1[αφipxt + wili + twi
dl
dt ]∑n
i=1 vt − Cov(ρi, qcplβ px¯iβt + qsplγ rz¯iγt) = −µ
∑n
i=1[αφip0 + wili + twilt]∑n
i=1
vt
µ − Cov(b, qcplβ px¯iβt + qcplγ rz¯iγt) = −
∑n
i=1 wili[1− twi(Sli + lM )]
According to Roy’s identity, vt = −∂ui∂yi ∂ei∂t = −wili ∂ui∂yi .
−∑ni=1[∂u∂y 1µwili + twilMwili]− Cov(b, qcplβ px¯iβt + qcplγ rz¯iγt) = −nwl +∑ni=1 wilitwi 1li ll liwi(1−t) ]
−∑ni=1 aiwili − Cov(b, qcplβ px¯iβt + qcplγ rz¯iγt) = −nwl + t1−t∑ni=1 wilill
−na¯w¯lCov (aia¯ , wiliw¯l )− na¯w¯l + nwl − Cov(b, qcplβ px¯iβt + qcplγ rz¯iγt) = t1−t∑ni=1 wilill
t
1−t = −
∑n
i=1 Cov(b, q
cpl
β px¯iβt+q
spl
γ rz¯iγt)+nwl(a¯Cov
(
ai
a¯ ,
wili
w¯l
)
+a¯−1)∑n
i=1 wilill
(13)
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